Not for the Law to Approve or Disapprove—A Comment on Professor Mnookin’s Paper by Goldstein, Joseph
HeinOnline -- 1984 Ariz. St. L.J. 685 1984
Not for the Law to Approve or
Disapprove-.-A Comment on Professor
Mnookin's Paper*
Joseph Goldstein**
In my comment on Professor Mnookin's paper I intend to discuss what
ought and ought not to be the function of law in supervening parental
wishes about medical care for their newborn child. I will reach conclu-
sions and make recommendations similar to Professor Mnookin's, but I
arrive at them by asomewhat different route. I am not qualified to and I
will not discuss the political observations and assessments that he makes.
Law, in a democ'ratic society, is meant not to confuse, but to clarify for
each of us in ordinary language the extent to which the state intends to
restrict our freedom to decide. As parents, we decide what medical care to
give our newborn child; as doctors, we decide what care to provide or even
to impose without' regard to parental wishes. The words of a statute
should provide the basis upon which ordinary citizens can know the extent
to which they are free to decide. Legislatures ought not make their statu-
tory answers obscure.
And although their statutes may be clearly written, legislatures must
not operate on the assumption that only we as members of some profes-
sional elite are entitled to know that the laws do not really mean what
I
they say-that they are not expected to be enforced. I cannot embrace as
prescription Profes~or Mnookin's endorsement of the Thurman Arnold
statement that laws "are enforced because we want to continue our con-
duct, and unrepealed because we want to preserve our morals."1 I do not
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and cannot share with Mnookin the view that this ought to be the way in
which legislatures should perceive the law.
On the other hand, the use of coercive force by the state to impose
some belief contrary to that held by parents about medical care for their
child, or contrary to that held by the doctors of their choice, must rest on
a very substantial societal consensus. On this proposition concerning the
actual use to which the power of the state should be put, Professor
Mnookin and I are probably in agreement. What we disagree upon is
whether the law on the books should, as I believe, reflect accurately that
consensus and no more. There should be no place in these laws for con-
sciou's ambiguity about their meaning or their enforcement.
An examination of the problem must begin with identifying the rela-
tionship of parent and child in law and their relationship to the state. To
be a child, particularly an infant child, is to be at risk and to be depen-
dent and without the capacity or authority to decide what is "best" for
oneself. To be an adult is to be a risk-taker, independent and with the
capacity and authority to decide what is "best" for oneself. To be an
adult who is a parent is to be presumed in law to have the capacity,
authority and responsibility to determine and to do what is good for one's
children. Indeed, the child has a right t6 parents who have and assume
full responsibility for making life and death judgments on his or her be-
half. The law must protect parental autonomy to make those decisions
which they, as the child's representative, think are best for their child, for
their other children, for their family. The law must safeguard that arena
of privacy that we call the family. Legislatures and courts must stay the
long arm of the law and of private, well-intentioned do-gooders from
breaching family integrity, from tearing the delicate and complex fabric
of human relationships that is the family. To make that observation is
also to recognize that adults can exploit their children, that the family
may become a cover for such exploitation, and that the state may have
reason and justification for intervening when a societal consensus is re-
flected in law that what the parents are or are not doing is wrong.
We recognize however-here Professor Mnookin and I agree-how
enormous is the confusion-philosophically, ethically and politi-
cally-about what is the right or what is the wrong decision for parents
whose consent is sought for "life" sustaining or "life" supporting medical
intervention for their newborn child. That there is no societal consensus is,
we would agree, solid evidence for denying the state the authority to use
its coercive power to impose someone's notion of the "only right" course
upon an infant whose parents have chosen otherwise. Respect for the dig-
nity of parents as human beings and for the integrity of family as a
human institution dictates that there be a strong presumption against
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state intervention and in favor of honoring the enormously difficult deci-
sions that parents must sometimes make about medical care for their chil-
dren. As one such parent observed:
My husband and 1 would have done anything to save that baby's
life, to make htfr better. In the hours that followed we had hope that
operations could be performed: we consoled each other with stories of
remarkable children we had both known who were retarded or had
birth defects. ,
However our' hopes were soon dashed.... Nothing could be done
to fix her heart and lungs or her wrist or her inability to suck. "This is
one of nature's lousy tricks," a young resident told us. But we were
the parents. We were responsible.... We cared for her and faced
our responsibilities. Luckier than some other Does, we had no choice
but to wait. However, those other Does are not shirking their responsi-
bilities. They are trying to figure out, sanely and rationally, what will
be best for their babies. They do not need squads of government in-
spectors or lawyers or judges to tell them what to do. The squads and
lawyers and judges will have no part in the raising of these Baby
Does, and it is ,inappropriate for them to be a part of the agonizing
decisions. In the rare cases where parents behave irresponsibly, there
are trained, compassionate doctors to make those decisions. After the
babies die, the issue is not closed. Our children will have to undergo
amniocentesis and prenatal testing because there has been a "genetic
failure" in our family. And they will know what to do, just as we did.
They will not need a Big Brother to guide them.2
Hardly more need be said about what ought to be beyond the limits of
law. To say this is not to maintain that parents will always make the
"right" decision-the decision you or I would reach. It is to say that the
absence of societal agreement about what is a right or wrong decision
should reserve that decision to the parents. To so reserve it means to pro-
tect parental decisionmaking and the decision itself from automatic re-
view by agents of the state, by legislatively mandated hospital commit-
tees, or by self-appointed private investigators. The birth of a baby Doe is,
by itself, no justification for state intervention-no justification for intru-
sion on the privacy ,of the family. Thus, precisely because there is no ob-
jectively wrong or right answer, the burden must be on the state to estab-
lish wrong, not on the parents to establish that what is right for them is
necessarily right for others. Thus the state, prior even to conducting an
investigation that intrudes on a particular family, must know not only the
definition of a wrong decision but also that there is probable cause for
2. Anonymous, The Parents Doe, THE NATION, Feb. 25, 1984, at 213.
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believing that a wrong decision has been made.
Apparently the newborn infant's right being discussed is not his or her
right to extraordinary medical intervention to prevent death. Rather it is
only a right not to have his or her parents but to have other adults called
judges or members of hospital committees make the "life" or "death"
decision. Since society cannot agree on guidelines for these parent substi-
tutes, there is no justification for taking away from parents, who mayor
may not wish to seek outside counsel, the decision that is theirs to make
for their child. There is nothing to suggest that the ethics of the mothers
and the fathers are diminished by the birth of their child, or that other
adults, who may themselves be parents, are better qualified to make the
hard decisions just because the legislature designates them "judge" or
"member" of a hospital review committee.
The requirement that the language of law be clear, precise and unam-
biguous about what it mandates and under what circumstances it may
intrude on the private ordering of our lives is meant to serve two func-
tions: one, to restrain the exercise of state power by declaring the extent,
nature and limits of the state's authority to invade parent-child, doctor-
patient and family relationships; and two, (at the same time and with the
same language) to give fair warning to each of us as parents or as health
care professionals of the limits the state has placed upon the decisions
that we may make about medical interventions for newborn infants. I
would not, as I think Professor Mnookin would, rely on Arizona's neglect
and child abuse statutes to resolve the question we confront at this confer-
ence. On their face and without regard to what courts may have ruled,
the language of those statutes does not satisfy the power-restraint and
fair-warning standards essential to safeguarding family integrity, parental
autonomy and the child's right to autonomous parents.
If there is to be state intervention, I would be inclined toward using
language not unlike that in the new Arizona statute.3 I would, however,
oppose such a statute myself, because I do not believe there is a real con-
sensus here or anywhere else about these matters. These deliberations at-
test to that. On the other hand, a presumption of consensus goes, at least
conceptually, with the adoption of a position by the legislature. The ap-
peal of the statute is that it declares in rather precise and specific lan-
guage the extent to which discretion is to be taken from parents. It does
not place the decision in a bio-ethics committee. It does not transfer pa-
rental discretion to some officially mandated committee to determine the
3. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-228\ (Supp. 1975-84); see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3620
(Supp. 1984-85); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2281, -2284 (Supp. 1975-84).
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right answer on a case-by-case basis. I say this because the committees
that have been discussed are left without guidelines for determining what
is right or wrong. Of course, I think that this so because we cannot find
guidelines about which we would agree. Thus I come back to saying that
it is better to leave the discretion-the difficult decision-with parents
than to turn it over to some other adults.
Sometime ago wy-Anna Freud, Albert Solnit and I-suggested lan-
guage that might be used in a statute authorizing the state to intervene
when parents refuse medical care for their child.4 That language does not
quite meet our standards for power restraint and fair-warning. We pro-
posed that state intervention would be justified (a) if medical experts
agree that the refused treatment is non-experimental and appropriate for
the child, that is, there is no conflict among the experts about the appro-
priateness of the medical recommendation and (b) if denial of the treat-
ment will result in the death of the child and-this is the difficult
part-(c) if the treatment can reasonably be expected to result in what
society would want for every child, a chance for normal healthy growth or
a life worth living. The problem lies in construing the meaning of the
phrase "a life worth living". The cases on which we are focusing do not
concern infants who expect normal healthy growth toward adulthood
when, as adults, they can decide what is best for themselves without re-
gard to parental control or without regard to some other adult making
critical judgments on their behalf. But I would suggest that the Doe case
to which Professor Mnookin and others have referred may well fit into the
"life worth living" c~tegory, and that through case law meaning might in
time be given to that phrase. Of course, there must be more than a com-
mon understanding about the meaning of "a life worth living". If society
insists through law that these children receive medical treatment rejected
by their parents, the'state must be ready to provide the special financial,
physical and psychological resources essential to making real for the child
it "saves" the value it prefers. 5
4. See BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 91-109, 194 (1979).
5. For an interesting English decision on this issue see, In re B. (A Minor) [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1421,
1423-24 (C.A.) (Templeman, J.):
[I]f this little girl does not have this operation she will die within a matter of days. If
she has the operation 'there is a possibility that she will suffer heart trouble as a result
and that she may die within two or three months. But if she has the operation and it is
successful, she has Down's syndrome, she is mongoloid, and the present evidence is that
her life expectancy is 'short, about 20 to 30 years.
The parents say that no one can tell what will be the life of a mongoloid child who
survives during that 20 or 30 years, but one thing is certain. She will be very handi-
capped mentally and physically and no one can expect that she will have anything like
a normal existence. They make that point not because of the difficulties which will be
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Thus, one of the limitations on the justification for intervention is that
the state may intervene only if it is prepared to assure that the situation
will be made better, not worse, for the child. If the parents will not or
cannot assume responsibility for the new burdens-if you will, for the
extraordinary demands on the limited amount of "bread" that they have
for their family6-and if the state is unwilling to fully provide for the
child's care, there is no justification for intervention. The state must be
able and prepared to provide the child with a permanent family-not an
institutional warehouse-that wishes to give the "saved" child the nur-
ture, affection, stimulation and continuity of care that are essential to a
life worth living.
I have no idea what the family situation was in the Indiana Doe case
nor do I have any idea what the state was willing to provide in terms of
care opportunities for that child in the event intervention was authorized,
so I am unable to be as emphatic as Professor Mnookin about the appro-
occasioned to them but in the child's interest. This is not a case in which the court is
concerned with whether arrangements could or could not be made for the care of this
child, if she lives, during the next 20 or 30 years;. the local authority is confident that
... good adoption arrangements could be made and that in so far as any mongol
child can be provided with a happy life then such a happy life can be provided.
On behalf of the parents, Mr. Gray has submitted very movingly, if I may say so,
that this is a case where nature had made its own arrangements to terminate a life
which could not be fruitful and nature should not be interferred with. He has also
submitted that in this kind of decision the views of responsible and caring parents, as
these are, should be respected, and that their decision that it is better for the child to be
allowed to die should be respected. Fortunately or unfortunately, in this particular case,
the decision no longer lies with the parents or with the doctors, but lies with the court.
It is a decision which of course must be made in the light of the evidence and views
expressed by the parents and the doctors, but at the end of the day it devolves on this
court in this particular instance to decide whether the life of this child is demonstrably
going to be so awful that in effect the child must be condemned to die, or whether the
life of this child is still so imponderable that it would be wrong for her to be condemned
to die.... Faced with that choice I have no doubt that it is the duty of this court to
decide that the child must live. The judge was much affected by the reasons given by
the parents and came to the conclusion that their wishes ought to be respected. In my
judgment he erred in that the duty of the court is to decide whether it is in the interests
of the child that an operation should take place (emphasis supplied).
6. Recall Mr. Jonsen's discussion of the moral significance act of an of omission as dependent
upon the priority of obligations in a given situation.
[I]f a starving person comes to your door and you have bread in the house, it is an
omission not to give him that food. Is this a sin? If the householder has a family in a
time of famine, Aquinas argued that he has prior duties to his children. Therefore, not
to give bread to the stranger at the door is not a morally culpable omission. The omis-
sion/commission distinction therefore must be understood in relationship to an under-
standing of what obligations exist in a given situation.
Jonsen, Traditional Distinctions for Making Ethical Judgments, 1984 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 661, 662.
HeinOnline -- 1984 Ariz. St. L.J. 691 1984
1984:685] BABY DOE WORKSHOP 691
priateness of that decision.
Going back to some of Professor Mnookin's earlier remarks, I sense
with him that there is something precious and disproportionate about the
amount of time in thought and in discussion that is being devoted to this
particular matter. There is, however, something very gratifying about the
extent of interest here and everywhere in the country. It is that we, as a
society, are sensitive and alert to the needs of those who are handicapped.
We will not ignore them. We do not treat them or think of them as appro-
priate subjects for :extermination, but regard them as fellow human beings
who deserve our concern and whose dignity we respect. At the same time,
the notion of disproportion that Professor Mnookin raises must be con-
fronted if only to assure ourselves that our concern for the Baby Does and
their parents does; not become a device by which we, as members of soci-
ety, blind ourselves to the needs of those who are unable to provide suffi-
cient food or medical care for themselves because of the way in which
limited resources are distributed. We ought not feel too good about our
involvement and investment in the matter that brings us together. It must
not give us perII1ission to ignore the extent to which there is hunger in
society, a need that cannot be covered over by White House pronounce-
ments to the contrary. There are starving children. Conferences such as
this must not be .used as an excuse for not dealing with society's failure to
provide every human being with what most of us believe is minimally
essential to "a life worth living".
I have one more comment about Professor .Mnookin's paper. I do not
see, as he does, that the only option for law is to approve or disapprove
the withholding or withdrawal of care in the kinds of cases with which we
are concerned. I see another choice open to the legislature and to the
courts-a choice obvious once said-it is that the law ought not to be
invoked to approve or disapprove. It is that the law must sometimes ac-
knowledge, indeed declare, that it does not know what the conventional
wisdom is. It is that the state recognizes that a right answer for you may
be a wrong answer for me and that the wrong answer for you may be the
right answer for me. That is, there is no universally wrong or right deci-
sion, independent of the family in which it is made. It is not that the state
or society is indifferent, but that it has high regard for family integrity
and parental autonomy. The great risk-the great danger-is not in the
few "mistakes" that will be made by allowing the freedom to decide to be
widely disper~ed-to be left with the many decision-making units we call
family. The risk to avoid is the massive mistake for society and especially
for individual families that may result from centralizing the decision-
making process or from dehumanizing family relationships by concentrat-
ing such personal and complex decisions in impersonal courts or legisla-
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tively mandated hospital ethics committees. The law should rely on the
more personal, flexible and highly decentralized system of family deci-
sion-making, and the law must be open about its reason for taking that
position. It must acknowledge that no one has the right answer for every-
one or almost everyone, that legislatures do not know enough and cannot
learn enough to justify their authorizing the use of coercive force to im-
pose one answer on all parents or to provide adequate guidelines for
courts or hospital review committees to exercise parental discretion for
children not their own. Legislatures must not "cop out" by writing or by
leaving unrepealed laws that are in conflict with custom and practice and
that they expect not to be enforced.
I will close with an observation made by C.S. Lewis:
Of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its
victims may be the most oppressive.... [T]hose who torment us for
our own good will torment us without end for they do so with the
approval of their own conscience.'
That view guides me in my thoughts, and I hope yours, about the limits of
law and its relation to each of us.
7. Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, 6 RES JUDICATAE 224, 228 (1952).
